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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

of Site contamination, it was not aware of governmental regulatory
action until much later. In addition, Ormet saw no need to notify
Insurers of any problems until after CERCLA's enactment. In
rejecting this argument, the court determined both that awareness of
regulatory action did not pertain to the notice of an "occurrence" and
water pollution laws existed in Ohio prior to the passage of CERCLA.
Ormet next argued a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether or not Ormet provided notice "as soon as practicable" after an
accident or suit. The court considered a 1989 memo from Ormet's
insurance administrator to Ormet's vice-president.
The memo
acknowledged the vice-president's awareness of Site contamination
and his subsequent discussion of the problem with Ormet's insurance
broker. The court concluded that no material fact existed because
Ormet's insurance administrator sent the memo three years before
Ormet's first notice of potential claims.
Finally, Ormet argued it handled the remediation in the most
efficient and cost-effective manner possible. Therefore, its insurers
were not prejudiced by a notification delay. The court concluded
Insurers were actually prejudiced by the notification delay as several
potential witnesses had died, and, as a result, Insurers had no
opportunity to question them.
Moreover, potential witnesses'
memories had faded and documents were lost.
The court concluded reasonable minds could not differ. Ormet
had failed to provide timely notice in violation of its insurance policies,
and Insurers were therefore entitled to summary judgment.
SarahE. McCutcheon
OKLAHOMA
Messer-Bowers Co. v. State, 8 P.3d 877 (Okla. 2000) (holding that, in a
groundwater use permit proceeding, the Oklahoma Resources Water
Board must look at the ultimate use of the groundwater to determine
whether waste by pollution will occur).
In 1996, Kronseder Farms, Inc. ("Kronseder") applied to the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("Water Board") for a groundwater
use permit for land on which Kronseder planned to construct a
concentrated swine feeding operation.
Surrounding landowners
("Landowners") opposed the application. They asserted Kronseder's
use of the requested groundwater would diminish and contaminate
their supply of groundwater from wells and springs. The Water Board
approved the application in 1996. The District Court on review
remanded the matter to the Water Board. In 1997, the Water Board
again approved the application. The district court upheld the order
and the court of appeals affirmed.
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On appeal, Landowners first challenged the Water Board's
decision to conduct the permit proceeding under groundwater
statutes. Landowners argued stream water use statutes applied to the
proceeding because natural springs existed in the area. The court
found the Water Board had correctly determined that Kronseder
sought the permit to drill several new wells and to use existing wells to
drain water directly from the groundwater basin, and thus, the
groundwater statutes applied.
Landowners also challenged the Water Board's determination that
Kronseder met the permit requirements. First, Landowners argued
Kronseder's withdrawal of the groundwater was for an unreasonable
use. The court found the Water Board had sufficiently addressed this
issue by limiting the number of wells that could operate at one time
and that no statutory limitation of reasonable use regarding removal of
groundwater existed. Secondly, Landowners claimed Kronseder's
operation would cause waste by depletion. The court concluded the
Water Board's finding, that Kronseder's evidence demonstrating that
no depletion would occur, was more credible, and thus upheld its
decision. Lastly, Landowners argued the Water Board incorrectly
limited its waste by pollution inquiry to the construction and operation
of Kronseder's wells and water distribution system. Landowners
claimed the Water Board was required to look at the ultimate use of
the groundwater to determine if waste by pollution would occur.
Landowners argued irrigation of crops with an effluent of manure
mixed with fresh groundwater would result in groundwater pollution.
Kronseder claimed the Water Board correctly determined that the
Department of Agriculture had exclusive jurisdiction over the disposal
of animal waste effluent on agricultural corps under the Oklahoma
Environmental Quality Act (the "Act"). Thus, the Water Board inquiry
was limited to the construction and operation of the water distribution
system. Kronseder also argued the Water Board correctly held that the
Act superceded the requirement that a groundwater permit applicant
present evidence concerning the effect of what it adds to fresh
groundwater and whether the additives will filter back and
contaminate the groundwater formation.
The court found the intent of the Act was to give the Department
of Agriculture and the Water Board concurrent environmental
jurisdiction over livestock facilities that require water permits. The
court held the pollution requirement must be determined by looking
at the ultimate use of the groundwater. The court remanded the case
to the Water Board to receive evidence and make findings of fact to
determine whether waste by pollution will occur through all uses of
groundwater at the Kronseder swine facilities.
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